Chris Adams

Electronic voting systems have been criticized on a number of counts. Ignoring the numerous systems designed by security-ignorant incompetants there's the much more important problem that none of the current systems provide any sort of audit trail. Since there's no paper record or a trusted-third party cryptographically signing things there's no way to be sure that records haven't been tampered with - digital records are simply too easy to perfectly forge.

This issue has been discussed many times to the point of becoming an FAQ. Unfortunately the San Diego County Registrar of Voters has chosen to mislead the public - presumably because an honest answer would paint them in a very bad light.

Here's a great example of disingenuity from their official FAQ:

Q: How do I know that the way the electronic voting system recorded my vote is the same way I cast my vote?
A: Before any vote is cast, there is a process of testing the machines to be sure they are working as expected. This process, known as logic and accuracy testing, allows election officials to be sure votes are counted as they are cast. After you have voted in the last contest on the ballot, a review screen will appear listing all the choices you have made and it will alert you if you missed voting in any contest or measure. From this screen, you can make corrections, as needed, to be sure your votes are counted the way you want them to be. When you are finished reviewing your selections, touch CAST BALLOT to record your vote.

Note that the has nothing to do with the actual question. The current systems, particularly Diebold's, provide no assurance whatsoever that the votes are actually tallied for the candidate the voter chose, that the reported summaries match the actual votes, or that the votes or reports have not been modified after the fact. The question clearly distinguishes between the act of casting a vote and it being record but either through ineptitude or malice the author of this FAQ ignores the entire issue.

A related question comes up about audit trails:

Q: What if a recount is necessary?
A: The new system provides San Diego County election officials with an image of the ballots cast on each voting device. The ballot images provide a means of recounting votes and ensuring that results are accurate.

Translated into English: We have no provisions for an accurate recount

It really is that simple. If the system is called into question the audit trail must be separate and tamper-resistant. If there is a reason to challenge the results all of the data on that machine must be considered suspect. Simply recounting the tainted data won't prove anything. Again, the official response is to answer something other than the actual question.

This continues the pattern of Sally McPherson's department actively neglecting their official responsibilities. These questions were brought up before the county signed its contract with Diebold and summarily dismissed by McPherson because a Diebold executive assured her they were unfounded. Given such heavy questioning there's no way to plausibly claim ignorance - McPherson and everyone else who signed off on the purchase either did not feel it necessary to perform even minimal levels of due diligence or they knowingly chose a patently unsuitable system for unknown reasons. Neither alternative is acceptable.